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THE CRITICS AND THE "CRISIS": A
REASSESSMENT OF CURRENT
CONCEPTIONS OF TORT LAW
Steven D. Smitht
The tort law system currently faces a crisis of legitimacy. Prom-
inent scholars contend that the system is both ineffective and intol-
erably expensive and urge that it be largely or entirely abandoned in
favor of alternative regulatory or insurance schemes for dealing with
accidents and injuries.' While abolition of our present tort law sys-
tem hardly seems imminent, many state legislatures, as well as Con-
gress, are considering (and sometimes enacting) far-reaching
statutory revisions.2
Critical evaluations of our present tort law system necessarily
adopt, at least implicitly, a conception of what tort law is all about-
a theory of what the system's functions and objective are and should
be. Most commentators assume that the system's primary objective
is to provide compensation for accident victims 3 or to deter unsafe
and uneconomical behavior.4 Some commentators also view pun-
ishment of wrongful conduct as a proper function of tort law. 5
Whatever the assumed objectives, however, the commentators level
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho. B.A., Brigham Young Univer-
sity, 1976; J.D., Yale Law School, 1979. I thank Dale Goble, Linda Pall, and Marshall
Shapo for reading and commenting upon an earlier draft of this essay.
1 E.g., O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for Personal Injury, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 17, 35 (1986) ("Almost anything is likely to be better than the common-law tort
system that lawyers have devised."); Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 917 (1985) (tort reform better achieved by administrative agencies than legislatures
or courts); Sugarman, DoingAway with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985) (proposing
bifurcation of compensation and deterrence, accomplishing compensation through so-
cial insurance and employee benefit plans and deterrence through regulatory schemes);
cf Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment on Calabresi and Klevorick, 14J. LEGAL
STUD. 633 (1985) (criticizing operation of tort law in remote causation and mass injury
cases and suggesting replacement of tort law in such cases by ad hoc compensation
plans).
2 Several commonly proposed "reforms" are reviewed in Birnbaum, Tort Reform
Proposals Analyzed, Nat'l LJ.,June 23, 1986, at 15, col. 1. Among the most prominent are
suggestions to (1) abolish the collateral source rule; (2) limit the liability of local govern-
ments; (3) establish sanctions for frivolous claims and defenses; and (4) structure pay-
ment of personal injury judgments to allow periodic payments. Id.; see also O'Connell,
supra note 1, at 26-31 (proposal for federal "no fault" legislation).
3 See infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
765
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
a shared indictment against the present system: it is ineffective and
fiscally inefficient in achieving these objectives.
Apologists for the tort law system ordinarily rebut such criti-
cisms on the critics' own terms. They may argue that the system does
effectively compensate accident victims, deter unsafe behavior, or
punish wrongful conduct.6 Similarly, they may insist that the critics'
alternative insurance and regulatory schemes would not achieve
their objectives any better than the present system does.7 These re-
sponses, although differing with the critics as to the merits of the
present tort law system, nonetheless implicitly accept the critics'
general conception of tort law's objectives-and, therefore, the crit-
ics' standards of evaluation as well. Such defensive strategies implic-
itly concede that the function of tort law is to compensate victims, to
deter unsafe behavior, or, perhaps, to punish wrongful conduct, and
that tort law should be evaluated by its success in achieving these
goals.
This essay suggests that both the attacks and the apologies
share a common flaw. The standard debate misperceives the essen-
tial function of the tort law system and consequently adopts incor-
rect standards for evaluating that system. Tort law's primary
function, this essay proposes, is not to compensate, deter, or pun-
ish, but rather to resolve disputes arising from perceived breaches
of important social norms, thereby reducing conflict and reaffirming
those norms.
This suggestion that tort law exists primarily to resolve disputes
seems at once prosaic and yet, in the current academic climate,
strangely alien.8 For many critics and defenders of the current sys-
6 See, e.g., Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos-Carnage, Cover-up,
and Litigation (Book Review), 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1695 (1986) ("[T]he tort system
emerged as the uniquely effective and indispensable means of exposing and defeating
the asbestos conspiracy, providing compensation to victims, and deterring future mal-
feasance."); cf Posner, Can Lawyers Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
747, 749-51 (1985) (defending tort law's ability to promote efficient behavior). See gener-
ally ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF
INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
TORT LAv (1984) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (concluding that the tort law system effec-
tively serves its stated goals).
7 See, e.g., Phillips, In Defense of the Tort System, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 603, 604-08 (1985)
(criticizing operation of workers compensation, no-fault, and social insurance alterna-
tives); Posner, supra note 6, at 751 (arguing that "all of the alternatives [to the present
tort law system] ... are bound to have serious problems of implementation and efficacy
of their own").
8 Grant Gilmore concluded The Ages of American Law by suggesting both the cen-
trality of law's dispute resolution function and our chronic tendency to ignore that
function:
[T]he lesson of the past two hundred years is that we will do well to be on
our guard against all-purpose theoretical solutions to our problems. As
lawyers we will do well to be on our guard against any suggestion that,
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tem, dispute resolution is not the objective of tort law, but rather is a
means of achieving tort law's real objective: compensation, deter-
rence, or punishment. This essay proposes that these priorities be
reversed: dispute resolution should be recognized as the objective of
tort law, whereas compensation, deterrence, or punishment are
merely means which the system employs as appropriate to achieve
its primary end. By inverting the means/end relationship presup-
posed in much scholarly analysis, 9 the proposed dispute resolution
approach renders the compensation, deterrence, and punishment
functions of tort law at most subsidiary and derivative. Accordingly,
from this perspective critiques which isolate such functions and then
use them as standards for evaluating the tort law system are funda-
mentally misconceived.
Section I of this essay summarizes the most prevalent criticisms
of the tort law system, focusing on the functions and objectives
which such criticisms attribute to tort law. Section II develops an
alternative conception of tort law as a process for resolving disputes
according to, and in reaffirmation of, social norms and expectations.
In doing so, section II relies upon recent research investigating the
social psychology of "justice." This research suggests that tort law's
dispute resolution function is more sensitive to societal and individ-
ual values than are proposals to replace tort law with insurance pro-
grams for dealing with injuries and the like.
The dispute resolution perspective developed in section II casts
tort law's traditional functions and objectives in a fundamentally dif-
ferent light. It illuminates purposes and consequences of compen-
sation, deterrence, and punishment which much contemporary
criticism either overlooks or deemphasizes. Section III takes a fresh
look at those functions from the perspective of dispute resolution
and re-examines the criticisms described in section I which presup-
pose the primacy of compensation, deterrence, and punishment.
I
CRITICISMS OF THE TORT LAW SYSTEM
The controversy over the adequacy of the current tort law sys-
through law, our society can be reformed, purified, or saved. The func-
tion of law, in a society like our own, is altogether more modest and less
apocalyptic. It is to provide a mechanism for the settlement of disputes
in the light of broadly conceived principles on whose soundness, it must
be assumed, there is a general consensus among us.
G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 109 (1977). This essay suggests that Gil-
more's "lesson" has gone largely unheeded in the current tort law debate.
9 For a discussion of the ways in which a claimant-based "internal" perspective
clarifies tort law's dispute resolution function and of how such a perspective differs from
much current scholarship, see Smith, Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69
MINN. L. REV. 277, 286-92 (1984).
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tern has generated a considerable literature. This section summa-
rizes the principal criticisms of the system, emphasizing the
functions and objectives which those criticisms attribute to tort law.
A. Conundrums in Compensation
A generation ago, scholars such as Fleming James regarded
compensation as tort law's primary objective.1 0 As the focus of
scholarship shifted to reduction of accident costs, compensation re-
ceived relatively less attention. Recent commentary, however, has
revived the emphasis on compensation as an animating goal of tort
law.11 Accepting compensation as a principal objective, critics of
the current system press two major objections. First, they contend
that tort law's choice of whom to compensate is irrational and capri-
cious. Second, they claim that the system, having chosen to com-
pensate particular claimants, errs in the amount of compensation
that it awards.
1. Caprice in the Choice of Beneficiaries
Critics argue that tort law employs irrational criteria in deciding
which injury victims should be compensated and which should not.
If tort law's function is to compensate persons who have suffered
loss as a result of accidental injury, the critics argue, it makes little
sense to compensate persons injured by another's negligence while
denying compensation to those injured by non-negligent human ac-
tivities, 1 2 illnesses, natural catastrophes, or physical and mental dis-
abilities. Such injuries may certainly be as severe as in the case of a
negligently inflicted harm. Moreover, in each instance the injuries
result from accidental or fortuitous causes. If a policy compensating
for accidental injuries is justified, the critics assert, then the system
should compensate all such victims.' 3
The point of this criticism is not merely that tort law errs in
10 See Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foun-
dations of Modern Tort Law, 14J. LEGAL S-rUD. 461, 465-83 (1985) (recounting develop-
ment and pervasive influence ofJames's analysis of tort law as a compensation system).
1 See generally Schwartz, Foreword: Tort Scholarship, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 548, 551 (1985)
(describing revival of compensation scholarship attempts to "reestablish the priority of
the compensation question").
12 Under strict liability doctrines, of course, some non-negligent human activities
may support liability for injuries which they cause. Even so, many injuries caused by
faultless human activity still fall outside tort law's remedial scope.
13 See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 592-93 (describing "liability gap" created when
accident victims are unable to identify a credible defendant); see also Ingber, Rethinking
Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 775 (1985) (if full compensa-
tion were system's goal, all accident victims would be compensated); cf Fleming, Is There
a Future for Tort?, 44 LA. L. REV. 1193, 1203-04 (1984) (discussing discrimination be-
tween accident victims); Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
665, 667 n.18 (1985) (agreeing with Sugarman's criticism, but suggesting that same
768 [Vol. 72:765
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applying its own criteria, so that claimants who should recover
under established liability rules sometimes lose while claimants who
should lose sometimes recover. Although the relative imprecision
of tort liability rules may exacerbate the problem, 14 that criticism
applies to any body of substantive law: error in applying the law to
particular cases is always a possibility. Rather, the critics' more fun-
damental objection is that tort law's compensation policy is capri-
cious and irrational in principle. This objection would retain its
force even if tort liability rules were applied with perfect accuracy
and consistency.
One natural response to this criticism is that tort law compen-
sates victims only when there is a wrongdoer who should be forced
to pay for the injury. Thus, negligence-caused injuries should be
treated differently than other kinds of accidental injuries. To re-
spond in this way, however, is merely to restate the problem: why, in
a system designed to compensate victims of accidental injuries,
should we distinguish negligence-caused from other accidental inju-
ries? Moreover, this defendant-based response shifts the defense of
tort law to other grounds, such as punishment or deterrence, which
deserve independent justification.1 5 If we focus solely on tort law's
purported compensation function, the critics have a point: there seems
to be no persuasive reason for distinguishing between victims of
human negligence and victims of other kinds of accidental injuries.
2. Incoherence in the Measurement of Compensation
After deciding which claimants to compensate, tort law faces
the daunting task of determining how much these claimants should
receive. Critics argue that here too the system fails dismally. Com-
pensation's cardinal principle prescribes that injured plaintiffs
should receive an amount necessary to make them "whole," that is,
to restore them to the position they would have occupied but for the
defendant's tortious conduct.16 This "make whole" principle is dif-
logic might require compensation for persons with "classifiable mental disease" and
other "mental conditions-including laziness and plain stupidity").
14 See generally Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 908-
09, 919-22 (1982) (characterizing modern tort system as dominated by vague principles
of reasonableness); Henderson, Expanding the Negligence Concept. Retreat from the Rule of
Law, 51 IND. LJ. 467 (1976) (criticizing indeterminacy of negligence doctrine).
15 This essay considers whether it is fair to evaluate tort law's compensation func-
tion independently of its other functions infra Section I(D).
16 See, e.g., Agoglia & Beckett, Personal Injury, in DEALING WITH DAMAGES 137, 138
(N. Itzkoffed. 1983) ("[T]he object [of personal injury damages] is to make the plaintiff
whole, addressing the totality of the wrong done .... ); Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full
Tort Recovery For Psychic Injury, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 333, 393 (1984) ("The point of com-
pensation in tort law is to put an injured plaintiff back in the same relative position that
he occupied before he was injured."); see also R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw
150 (2d ed. 1977); 1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 30 (A.
1987] 769
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ficult enough to apply to a plaintiff's purely monetary loss, such as
medical expenses or future lost earnings. However, when we apply
the standard to nonpecuniary intangible losses such as pain and suf-
fering, psychic injury, or distress from the loss of a loved one, quan-
tifying such losses in monetary terms becomes not merely difficult
but conceptually impossible.1 7
The impossibility of measuring intangible losses generates di-
verse and conflicting criticisms: awards for intangible losses are con-
sidered both overcompensatory and undercompensatory.18 Neither
criticism seems entirely apposite, however, because each presup-
poses that intangible losses are capable of translation into monetary
terms and argues that courts merely get the translation wrong. In
fact, intangible losses and monetary damages are simply incommen-
surable.1 9 The real difficulty with damage awards for intangible loss
is that they purport to be compensatory when in reality they are
not.20 It is misleading to talk as if a translation could be correct or
incorrect when the very concept of translation is meaningless. In-
deed, the notion of calculating damages for intangible injuries inevi-
tably suggests that mangled limbs and deceased spouses or children
can be treated as commodities subject to purchase, sale, or
bargain. 21
Some defenders of the tort system respond that although intan-
Sedgwick & J. Beale 9th ed. 1912). Some refer to the "make whole" concept as the
principle of restoring plaintiffs to their "original" or "rightful" position. E.g., D. LAY-
COCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 15 (1985).
17 See Ingber, supra note 13, at 778-79; O'Connell, supra note 1, at 19.
18 Compare O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in
Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333, 339 (pain and
suffering damages lead to "fortuitous profits for the trivially injured, as well as planned
profits for the fraudulently uninjured") with R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 149-50 (damage
awards for intangible injuries usually undercompensate those seriously harmed).
19 Such intangible injuries, of course, may generate costs such as the costs of medi-
cal care or psychological counseling that are pecuniary in character and thus truly com-
pensable, but compensation for the harms themselves is conceptually impossible.
20 In a sense, the claim that awards for intangible injuries are undercompensatory
and the claim that they are overcompensatory are both correct. Such awards leave tort
victims uncompensated for real losses; on the other hand, they give tort victims substan-
tial amounts of money that can serve no real compensatory purpose. Cf Borer v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 447, 563 P.2d 858, 862, 138 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306
(1977) ("[M]onetary compensation will not enable plaintiffs to regain the companion-
ship and guidance of a mother; it will simply establish a fund so that upon reaching
adulthood ... they will be unusually wealthy men and women.").
21 Richard Abel argues that "damages for pain and suffering commodify experi-
ence" and that damages awards for injuries to relationships commodify love. Abel,
Torts, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 185, 195 (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
In tort law, therefore, "all relationships are treated as a form of prostitution." Id. at 196;
see also Hutchinson, Beyond No-Fault, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 762 (1985) ("In pursuing the
liberal approach [to compensation], the market has converted health into another com-
modity to be traded for and traded off. Human life and suffering represent just one
more variable in the production-consumption equation.").
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gible losses are admittedly very difficult to quantify in monetary
terms, they are not in principle incommensurable with dollars.22 One
attempt to equate intangible losses with monetary damages relies
upon a pleasure/pain ratio. 23 Before being injured, this approach
suggests, a tort victim enjoyed a particular ratio of pleasure to pain.
Intangible injuries, such as physical suffering or the loss of a loved
one, skew this ratio by augmenting the pain side of the equation and
reducing the pleasure side. Although compensation may not cor-
rect the victim's precise injuries, the theory runs, it does allow the
victim to purchase other pleasures, thereby restoring the plea-
sure/pain ratio which she previously enjoyed. 24 To use a crude but
not atypical example, the law may not be able to bringJane's spouse
back to life or ease the grief she feels from her loss, but a damage
award can permit her to purchase pleasure, such as hot fudge sun-
daes, or a season's pass to the golf course, and thereby restore her
pleasure/pain ratio to approximately its former level.
This attempt at commensurability succeeds only if we can re-
duce the rich complexity of human experience to the procrustean
categories of pain and pleasure. If we resist such reduction, how-
ever, we see thatJane's former enjoyment of her husband's compan-
ionship and her enjoyment of the taste of hot fudge sundaes are
wholly different kinds of experiences: Jane's psyche harbors no uni-
tary quality or entity which corresponds to the word "pleasure." It
is only the illusion of unity which this word provides that allows the
reductionist to pretend that we can somehow compare Jane's di-
verse experiences on a single spectrum. The attempt to make intan-
gible injury commensurable with money by fabricating a
pleasure/pain ratio overlooks what Alasdair MacIntyre has aptly
termed the "polymorphous character of pleasure." 25
22 One attempt to correlate intangible injuries with money damages employs the
notion of a hypothetical market for injuries. R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OFJUSTICE 61-
62 (1981); see R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 149-51. This essay considers the market
approach to measuring damages below. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text. At
this point it is sufficient to note that the hypothetical market approach, even if feasible, is
not specifically designed to make individual victims "whole" and would in many cases
undermine the "make whole" principle. The subjective "value" of an intangible injury
in the mind of a particular plaintiff would often bear little relation to the injury's "mar-
ket value." Thus, a plaintiff receiving the injury's "market value" would often end up
more than, or less than, "whole."
23 Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm-A Comment on
the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 502-04 (1982).
24 See Bell, supra note 16, at 398 (through award for intangible injury, "[t]he plain-
tiff is invited to purchase units of pleasure to offset the units of pain he has
experienced").
25 A. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE 64 (2d ed. 1984). Macntyre explains that "differ-
ent pleasures and different happinesses are to a large degree incommensurable: there
are no scales of quality or quantity on which to weigh them." Id.
1987]
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In sum, if tort law's objective is to compensate, then its efforts
to articulate appropriate measures of recovery seem not merely inef-
fective but fundamentally misconceived. The recognition of com-
pensation's conceptual flaws almost certainly underlies recent
efforts to "reform" tort remedies by, for instance, imposing limits
on damages awardable for intangible injuries. 26
B. Difficulties in Deterrence
A second commonly posited objective of tort law is to deter un-
safe or imprudent behavior that results in injuries which are not
cost-justified. Although a deterrence analysis can become intricate
and divide advocates of negligence and strict liability rules,27 the
basic idea is straightforward: tort law should encourage investment
in safety up to, but not beyond, the point at which incremental
safety costs equal incremental injury costs. Spending either more or
less for safety constitutes an inefficient allocation of resources. Effi-
ciency-minded proponents of the tort system argue that the system
creates (or could create) incentives for injurers to adopt the appro-
priate safety measures. If the system holds injurers responsible for
the injury costs which they generate, it will motivate them to adopt
cost-justified safety measures. 28 Injuries, in this view, are a cost of
the activities from which they result.
Critics of the system respond to the deterrence rationale in two
ways. Some broadly assert that tort law has no substantial deterrent
effects. 29 The deterrence view of tort law, these critics argue, rests
upon wildly unrealistic assumptions about human knowledge, deci-
sion making, and conduct. To believe that tort law deters inefficient
26 E.g., 1986 Md. Laws ch. 639 (adopting $350,000 ceiling for all noneconomic per-
sonal injury damage awards); see Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 18, col. 3.
27 Compare Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE LJ.
1055 (1972) (advocating strict liability as best way of reducing accident costs) with Pos-
ner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) [hereinafter Theory of Negligence]
(arguing that negligence doctrine reduces accident costs) and Posner, Strict Liability: A
Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 213-15 (1973) (criticizing Calabresi and Hirschoff's strict
liability proposal). But see Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liabil-
ity, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 535, 555-56 (1985) (acknowledging that strict liability is preferable
in some categories of product injury cases). For a recent, refined analysis of the effi-
ciency implications of alternative negligence and strict liability rules, see Calabresi &
Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1985).
28 The classic exploration of tort law's role in reducing both accidents and accident
prevention costs is G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTs (1970). A good exposition
of the competing Chicago view of deterrence is Landes & Posner, The Positive Economic
Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REv. 851 (1981).
29 For an extensive critical analysis of tort law's deterrence rationale, see Sugarman,
supra note 1, at 564-81; cf Pearson, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychic Harm: A Response
to Professor Bell, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 413, 417 (1984) ("It is unlikely in the extreme that the
law relating to damages for emotional harm will have any impact on how people
behave.").
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behavior, one must accept that (1) human beings know what the law
is; (2) they have the information and ability to perform the sophisti-
cated cost/benefit calculus upon which the deterrence rationale re-
lies; and (3) humans are rational creatures who actually make and
act upon such cost/benefit calculations. Critics claim that such as-
sumptions contradict not only ordinary experience and observation,
but psychological research as well.30
The second objection to the deterrence rationale suggests that
even if the psychological assumptions of the deterrence view were
sound, tort law still would not produce optimal levels of safety in-
vestment. Optimal levels would be achieved only if all actual injury
costs-and no more than actual costs-were allocated to the injury-
causing activities. If injurers are liable for less than actual costs, their
incentive to adopt safety measures is insufficient; if they are liable
for more than the actual costs of injuries, they overinvest in safety.31
In practice, it seems certain that tort law does not allocate to
injurers even the approximate costs of injuries. Most injury victims
never assert claims. 32 Others settle their cases for less, or more,
than they would have received had they gone before a jury.33 More-
over, even when a victim asserts a claim and the tort process runs
full course, the impossibility of measuring intangible losses poses
intractable problems. Although intangible, such losses are undenia-
bly real and thus merit inclusion among the costs assigned to the
injury-causing activity.34 However, the conceptual incommensura-
bility of intangible losses and monetary compensation forecloses the
possibility of allocating the correct amount of costs to the injury-
30 See Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 YALE LJ.
697, 710-19 (1978) (criticism of psychological assumptions underlying deterrence de-
fense of contributory negligence doctrine); cf Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories
of Tort Liability, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 677, 678-79 (1985) (criticizing behavioral assumptions
in typical deterrence analysis).
31 R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 143.
32 See Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33
VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1296 (1980) ("Only a small fraction of personal injuries ... actually
yield a claim for compensation."); cf Best & Andreasen, Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory
Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAw &
Soc'7 REV. 701 (1977) (empirical study showing that few perceived consumer problems
result in complaints to sellers).
33 The implications of nonassertion and settlement of claims for the deterrence ra-
tionale are discussed in Smith, supra note 9, at 308-14.
34 One commentator notes,
Unless the full costs of physical and emotional distress are properly inter-
nalized through tort law, the price of the activities that generate such in-
juries will insufficiently reflect their actual costs. In effect, victims or the
public would subsidize the cost of high-risk activities, thereby leading to
inadequate deterrence and resource misallocation.
Ingber, supra note 13, at 799 (footnote omitted); see also Bell, supra note 16, at 349.
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causing conduct.3 5
Proponents of deterrence through tort law would overcome this
difficulty by relying upon a "hypothetical market" measure for in-
tangible injuries.3 6 It is, of course, conceivable that we could estab-
lish "markets in mutilation":3 7 we could perform studies to
determine how much money people would demand before agreeing
to accept certain levels of pain, the mangling of body parts, or the
death of loved ones. And our unwillingness actually to conduct
such studies does not prevent judges and jurors from estimating
what the results of such studies might be. Ifjudges and jurors could
properly perform the task,38 awarding damages for intangible inju-
ries according to a hypothetical market measure might well assign
the correct costs to injurious activities.
But the hypothetical market approach has serious flaws. Per-
haps most obviously, there is no reason to expect that juries,
through freeform thought experiments, could accurately estimate
the values that a hypothetical injury market would assign to particu-
lar injuries. Indeed, it is doubtful that such a project is even intelli-
gible. For example, most people would surely refuse to incur
certain injuries (most obviously loss of life) for any amount of
money. Does the hypothetical market measure mean that the mone-
tary cost of such injuries is infinite? If so, how would a jury express
that value in an actual damage award?
An economist might reply that people simply do not behave as
if life has infinite value:3 9 people agree, for a price, to perform tasks
involving a serious risk of death. But that observation hardly estab-
lishes the feasibility of placing a market value on intangible injuries.
If a firefighter will accept an assignment involving a one percent
chance of death in exchange for a $1,000 bonus, it hardly follows
that the firefighter values his life at $100,000. Would anyone be sur-
prised if the same firefighter demanded $1,000,000 to incur a fifty
percent chance of dying (rather than $50,000) and refused at any
price to accept a job involving a ninety-five percent risk of death?
Such varying responses to the threat of death, although profoundly
unmathematical, are profoundly human. The discrepancy simply
35 See Ingber, supra note 13, at 803 ("Considerable variations in damage awards for
[intangible] injuries make any likelihood of an 'accurate' cost evaluation and 'proper'
resource allocation a matter of blind faith.").
36 E.g., R. POSNER, supra note 16, at 149-51.
37 The phrase is Judge Posner's. He explains that the absence of such markets is
the source of our difficulty in placing a value on certain kinds of injuries. R. POSNER,
supra note 16, at 149.
38 Judge Posner suggests that evidence of the premiums in the form of additional
compensation demanded by workers engaged in risky activities might help in ascertain-
ing the market value of particular injuries. See id. at 151.
39 See id. at 150-51.
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shows that matters involving life and death, and probably other seri-
ous intangible injuries as well, are beyond the competence of the
market's mundane computing rationality. Hence, applying a market
value approach to such matters merely appears grotesque or ob-
tuse.40 The inadequacy of the market approach is hardly surprising;
intangible injuries and monetary measures are, as suggested
above41 (and, I suspect, as nearly any lay person would cheerfully
concede), incommensurable.
Moreover, even if the hypothetical market approach were capa-
ble of measuring intangible injuries, the approach does not describe
existing tort law. Present doctrine reflects a deliberate decision not
to ask jurors to determine an appropriate market value for an injury
or to decide how much they, or someone else, would demand before
agreeing to incur a particular injury.42 The hypothetical market ap-
proach remains an economist's mirage; it is not a real-world instru-
ment for measuring intangible losses. Accordingly, the argument
that tort law can allocate to injurers the correct costs of injuries and
thereby prompt the correct level of safety investment seems mani-
festly implausible.
C. Problems with Punishment
A third objective often attributed to the tort law system is the
40 For instance, while Judge Posner recognizes that a child's value to its parents is
not limited to the monetary income that the child might provide them, he nonetheless
remains committed to applying a hypothetical market approach in assessing the parent's
loss upon the child's death. Hence, Posner has suggested that a minimum estimate of
the parents' loss might be their investment in time and money in rearing the child to the
date of its death. The child must be worth at least this much to the parents, or else why
would they have made the investment? Id. at 150-51. Even from the market perspective,
however, Posner's reasoning seems detached from reality; a moment's reflection sug-
gests various possibilities that such reasoning ignores. The child might well have been a
source of worry and anguish to the parents: it might have represented a losing invest-
ment-but one, which unlike stocks and bonds, the parents could not voluntarily unload
because of legal and social constraints. On the other hand, the parents might have more
than recouped their investment through the emotional satisfaction they received in the
child's early years; they might have anticipated, as the child entered the more taxing
teenage years, that the child's incremental value to them would decline dramatically.
Finally, the parents' financial investment might consistently have equalled the emotional
dividends with which the child rewarded them-the child's death would produce an eco-
nomic wash. Of course, the point of this discussion is not to generate refinements in the
methods of child appraisal, but to underscore the absurdity of treating the worth of a
child, or the pain of bereaved parents, as an accounting problem.
41 See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
42 Courts have "uniformly rejected" both the "Golden Rule argument, which asks
jurors how much they would want if they had suffered plaintiff's injuries," and "[t]he
argument that jurors should give the market value of the injuries, or the amount it would
cost to hire someone to suffer these injuries." D. LAYcocK, supra note 16, at 76.
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punishment of wrongdoers. 43 Critics of this ostensible function as-
sert two principal objections. One holds simply that punishment is
not a legitimate state function. 44 This objection equates punish-
ment with simple vengeance-a relic of the primitive need to "get
even." Professor Sugarman describes the punishment rationale as
follows: "Tort is necessary in order to strike back at and hurt wrong-
doers." 45 So depicted, the punishment rationale seems more com-
patible with Mosaic law's "eye for eye" 46 (or lex talionis) approach
than with an "enlightened" twentieth-century jurisprudence.47
A second objection to the punishment function asserts that
even if punishment is an appropriate state function, tort law is a
poor instrument for the task. Tort rules often impose liability upon
persons or institutions for conduct that cannot be considered
blameworthy. 48 Strict liability doctrines expressly renounce "fault"
as a requisite for liability. Even negligence principles employ an
"objective" standard of reasonable conduct that may impose liabil-
ity upon persons who lack the subjective ability to understand or
conform to objective standards and who thus cannot be considered
culpable.49
Moreover, even when a defendant is blameworthy, tort sanc-
tions often seem radically out of proportion to the defendant's
"fault." 50 If a motorist cited for driving thirty-one miles per hour in
a thirty miles-per-hour zone were fined $500,000, most people
43 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 13, at 667-68; ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 4-170 to
-173.
44 See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 610 (noting "fundamental theoretical problems
with viewing our tort system as a punishment scheme").
45 Id. at 609. In a similar vein, Professor Owen explains that punishment
"provid[es] psychological 'satisfaction' to the victim-who receives pleasure from caus-
ing the injurer himself now to suffer." Owen, supra note 13, at 668. Despite this lurid
characterization, Owen believes that punishment is "in principle" a proper objective of
tort law. Id.
46 Deuteronomy, 19:21.
47 Cf. Miller & Vidmar, The Social Psychology of Punishment Reactions, in THE JUSTICE
MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 145, 150 (M. Lerner & S. Lerner eds. 1981) ("Punishment
for the purpose of deflecting vengeance is probably more significant and common in
tribal societies .... ).
48 O'Connell, supra note 1, at 19 (notion that tortfeasor is "an evil person" no
longer correct); Sugarman, supra note 1, at 610 (citing strict liability doctrine and situa-
tions where defendant is incapable of improving behavior as examples of liability for
nonblameworthy conduct).
49 See G. CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATrrrUDES AND THE LAw 22 (1985) ("To act
reasonably one had to do more than do the best one could, at a minimum one also had
to behave as a reasonably prudent man would have behaved under the circumstances.");
Theory of Negligence, supra note 27, at 31-32 ("A man may be adjudged negligent though
he did his best to avoid an accident and just happens to be clumsier than average.").
50 Professor Owen observes, "The scales ofjustice are hardly righted by requiring a
slightly guilty injurer to relieve the victim of his entire loss; they are only tipped the
other way." Owen, supra note 13, at 669.
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would regard the fine as grossly disproportionate to the offense.
Yet, under the "negligence per se" doctrine,5 1 if the same motorist's
speeding happens to cause an unintended but serious injury to a
bystander, the motorist might be held liable for a comparable dam-
age award. This result is difficult to explain by reference to any sen-
sible notion of punishment.
D. Dissonance-the "House Divided" Syndrome
By separately analyzing tort law's performance of three in-
dependent functions, the foregoing criticisms may seem to rely un-
fairly upon a "divide and conquer" strategy. Even if no single
objective or function can justify the system's considerable expense,
perhaps we might defend it on the basis of its partial achievement of
several objectives. 52 Critics respond, however, that the system fares
even worse if its goal is simultaneously to satisfy multiple objectives:
they argue that each function pulls tort law in a different direction,
producing an internal strain that 'renders the system incapable of
effectively discharging any of its functions. 53
That dissonance should result from such disparate aims is
hardly surprising. After all, the compensation function suggests the
need for liability rules that impose injury costs on those parties most
capable of bearing and redistributing such costs. The deterrence
function, on the other hand, suggests that those parties best able to
avoid accidents or to evaluate the cost-justified amount of safety
should bear losses. Finally, the punishment function demands that
losses be assigned to morally blameworthy parties. There is no rea-
son to expect compatibility among these various directives. Quite
often the party most capable of bearing and spreading losses is not
in the best position to avoid injuries or to evaluate safety costs. 54
Moreover, if the cost-bearing party can simply pass the loss onto a
diffuse group of customers or fellow liability policy-holders, the
sanction's deterrent effect will obviously diminish. Finally, the best
loss spreaders or accident avoiders may be morally blameless.
In short, tort law's compensation, deterrence, and punishment
functions appear to prescribe, respectively, an insurance policy, a
regulatory policy, and a retribution policy. These policies, while oc-
51 For a general discussion of the "negligence per se" doctrine, see W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 36, at 229-31 (5th ed. 1984).
52 Cf. ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 11-2 (suggesting that strength of tort law is its
capacity "of responding to multiple social goals, necessarily invoking plural rationales").
53 See Sugarman, supra note 1, at 616 ("By trying to do many different things ....
tort law ends up doing none of them well.").
54 Injuries resulting from the misuse or unintended use of products are an exam-
ple: the consumer may be best able to avoid injury by using the product properly, but
the manufacturer may be best able to bear and spread injury costs.
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casionally complementary, ultimately pull the law in different direc-
tions.55 Indeed, the very suggestion that a single institution could
simultaneously pursue three such divergent objectives seems to un-
dermine any claim to institutional rationality. Critics suggest in-
stead that each function might be better served by separate
institutions, such as social insurance programs, regulatory agencies,
and the criminal justice system, that are specifically designed for and
devoted to achieving those disparate objectives.56
II
AN ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION: TORT LAW AS A DISPUTE
RESOLUTION SYSTEM
The criticisms considered in the preceding section are powerful
ones. In fact, they may be too powerful. The cogency of those criti-
cisms rests, after all, upon the assumption that compensation, deter-
rence, and punishment are the objectives of tort law. If tort law is as
ill-suited to accomplishing compensation, deterrence, and punish-
ment as critics suggest, then we must question whether it is at all
proper to attribute those goals to tort law. If tort law instead has a
primary function different than compensation, deterrence, and pun-
ishment, then it is hardly pertinent to attack tort law for failing to
achieve those ends. The very incompatibility of the tort law system
with such objectives suggests that critics, as well as many propo-
nents, have misconceived the proper function of that system.
This section proposes that tort law's primary function is simply
to resolve disputes. Concededly, an unadorned dispute resolution
function may seem somewhat modest to justify the elaborate proce-
dural and substantive edifice that constitutes tort law. Moreover,
proponents of alternative compensation schemes might respond
that their programs would largely obviate the need for dispute reso-
lution: if social insurance compensated victims, they would no
longer need to seek redress through adversary action against their
supposed injurers. In response to these objections, this section ar-
gues that tort law's dispute resolution function serves vital needs,
both social and individual, that social insurance programs cannot. I
first consider a societal perspective and suggests that dispute resolu-
tion through tort law reinforces the normative order enabling us to
live as a society. Then I examine dispute resolution from an individ-
55 Cf. Fleming, supra note 13, at 1203 ("The more you fine-tune internalization or
risk-avoidance, the more you get away from the principle of insurance, that is, risk-
spreading.").
56 See, e.g., Owen, supra note 13, at 674 (proposing that legislatures abolish the acci-
dent law of tort and use instead a public welfare system for compensation and public
regulation to punish and deter undue hazards).
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ual standpoint and argue that tort law's performance of that func-
tion recognizes and responds to the totality of a victim's injury in a
way that mere compensation cannot.
A. A Societal Perspective: Dispute Resolution and the
Normative Order
In any moderately complex or diverse society, disagreements
and disputes among members inevitably arise. Commentators often
observe that resolving such disputes through law helps prevent the
violence that would otherwise accompany private vindication of
grievances. 57 Nonetheless, although tort law clearly benefits society
by preventing violence and maintaining civil peace, this observation
does not fully capture the pervasive influence of dispute resolution
in upholding the social order.
Dispute resolution's full significance becomes apparent only
when viewed in the broader context of the social universe which
human beings inhabit. That universe is composed, in large part, of
a system of social norms-"shared expectations and guidelines for
belief and behavior."58 In much the same way that gravitational and
kinetic laws give order to the physical universe, social norms give
order to the social universe: all of us rely constantly upon norms in
deciding how we should think, speak, and behave and in anticipating
how others in society will think, speak, and behave. Without such
norms, social intercourse would be unpredictable and chaotic. Rec-
ognized norms are thus an essential condition of rational social
life.59
Unlike natural laws, however, social norms are hardly inviola-
ble: transgression of norms is a common occurrence. And when
transgressions occur, society must decide how to respond. Choos-
ing a response is a delicate process, involving competing concerns.
On the one hand, if society permits deviation from its norms, the
57 See, e.g., Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and
the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1815-16 (1986)
("In the absence of an effective peaceful means of vindicating private rights, people
retain a plausible claim that they are entitled to vindicate these rights through self-
help."); see also Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 372
(1978) ("The object of the rule of law is to substitute for violence peaceful ways of
settling disputes.").
58 S. KIESLER, INTERPERSONAL PROCESSES IN GROUPS AND ORGANIZATIONS 96 (1978).
A norm... is a rule or a standard that governs our conduct in the social
situations in which we participate .... It is a cultural specification that
guides our conduct in society. It is a way of doing things, the way that is
set for us by our society. It is also ... the essential instrument of social
control.
R. BIERSTEDT, THE SOCIAL ORDER 175 (1957).
59 See S. KIESLER, supra note 58, at 98 (norms provide social life with "structure,
strength, and substance").
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norms will come to lose their force and reliability.60 Thus, imposing
sanctions (which may range in severity from a stern glance to a stiff
criminal sentence) upon norm-violators is essential to maintaining
the system of norms upon which an orderly, rational society
depends.6'
On the other hand, society must take care that its enforcement
of norms is not unduly severe. Some norms are relatively trivial and
imposition of a strong sanction upon one who violates such a norm
would seem incongruous and inhumane. And even with respect to
more fundamental norms, excessive penalties may be detrimental.
For example, social psychologists have found that mild sanctions are
often more effective than harsh sanctions in causing people to inter-
nalize social norms.62 Moreover, social norms do and should
evolve; deviation from a norm is one way of changing it, perhaps in
a beneficial way. 63 Overly rigid enforcement of norms might lead to
social ossification.
In sum, society must enforce its norms, but it must not enforce
them too rigorously or mechanically. 64 Although no single test or
criterion can wholly reconcile these competing needs, one factor
which powerfully influences the response to norm violation is the
resulting harm or lack of harm. 65 A trivial norm violation, such as a
60 See id. at 120-21; see also M. DEUTSCH, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A SOCIAL-PSYCHO-
LOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 181 (1985) ("Members of a group who accept common norms of
justice also share obligations to protect these norms and to respond to their violation.");
cf. Miller & Vidmar, supra note 47, at 155 ("Laws and rules derive from social groups. In
addition to providing behavioral proscriptions, they help to define the boundaries and
the social reality of the group .... Violation of these laws or rules constitutes a threat to
the group.").
61 See R. BIERSTEDT, supra note 58, at 183 ("Sanctions are the supporters of the
norms, the punishments applied to those who do not conform .... ").
All social systems include certain additional instrumentalities for induc-
ing socially appropriate behavior. Perhaps the most important of these
are social sanctions.
Broadly defined, sanctions represent the rewards and punishments
allocated to group members by other individuals and the group at large
in consequence of adherence to or departure from the behavioral norms
prescribed by the group.
Inkeles & Levinson, National Character: the Study of Modal Personality and Sociocultural Sys-
tems, in 4 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 418, 471-72 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson
eds. 1969).
62 See E. ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 149 (4th ed. 1984) ("The less severe the
threat, the less external justification; the less external justification, the greater the need
for internal justification.").
63 See S. KIESLER, supra note 58, at 120-23 (noting integration as example of devia-
tion that has become beneficial social innovation).
64 One commentator explains that "groups need both conformity to norms and
roles and they need deviance .... [Clonformity provides stability, including predictable
degrees of change, structure, and meaning. Deviance is a source of growth." Id. at 122.
65 See Miller & Vidmar, supra note 47, at 158 ("In general, the greater the harm, the
greater the punishment reaction.").
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breach of table etiquette, usually harms no one; such a violation
therefore results at most in social disapproval. At the other ex-
treme, criminal law enforces norms, such as the norm against taking
human life, whose violation consistently results in serious harm. Be-
tween these extreme lies a set of norms that, although important,
are not as imperative as those enacted into criminal law. Such mid-
dle level norms constitute the essence of tort law,66 which seeks to
capture such norms with formulas that often amount to little more
than open-ended, incorporative allusions to whatever pertinent so-
cial norms may exist. Thus, when people act in ways that affect
others, tort law requires them to use the care expected of "the rea-
sonable person." 67 Similarly, manufacturers must produce goods
that conform to "consumer expectation." 68
Tort law imposes sanctions for violations of these norms only
when such violations result in injuries that in turn generate disputes
among members of society. By limiting itself to dispute resolution,
tort law avoids overly rigid enforcement of norms and directs its
efforts to maintaining those norms which society most clearly wants
reinforced. Society preserves social norms, after all, not for their
own sake, but because people rely upon them-and need to be able
to rely upon them-in conducting their lives. If no one objects to
the violation of a norm, the reason for maintaining the norm disap-
pears. It is only when a violation gives rise to a dispute that rein-
forcing the norm becomes important. When a dispute occurs, a
court's essential task is to resolve the dispute by determining
whether a norm has been violated and, if so, what the consequences
of the violation should be.69 In doing so, the court reaffirms those
norms that make rational society possible.
66 Cf. ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-23 (court and jury define limits of commu-
nity's tolerance).
In reality, of course, norms and social responses do not fall into three neat catego-
ries. Occasionally, criminal law embodies norms whose violation may not cause serious
harm to others-laws against marijuana use might be an example. Moreover, violations
of imperative norms may result in tort sanctions as well as in criminal punishments.
67 See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, § 32.
68 See Wheeler, Comment on Landes and Posner, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 575, 576 (1985)
(noting that many courts have adopted "consumer expectation" test for products liabil-
ity). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, § 99, at 698-99; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A comment i (1965).
69 This description of the relationship between tort law and social norms does not
suggest that applying such norms in tort cases is simple, mechanical, or purely one-
directional. The content of pertinent norms is often controversial, in part because differ-
ent individuals perceive the norms differently and because different groups in a society
may conform to different norms. The jury's role assumes vital importance in this re-
gard, as a (hopefully) representative and unbiased index of prevailing norms. Moreover,
tort law does not simply reflect social norms. Judges, lawyers, and litigants are partici-
pants in society, after all, and are therefore actively involved in evaluating and shaping
norms as well as in reacting to and applying them.
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From a societal perspective, therefore, tort law's dispute resolu-
tion function is vital not merely because it prevents private violence,
but more importantly because it reinforces the normative order
upon which society depends.70 A negative example illustrates the
point. Imagine that the tort system degenerated to the point that it
either ceased to exist or, although continuing to decide cases, ren-
dered bizarre and chaotic results that failed to reflect society's sense
of justice. One possible consequence of such a breakdown is that
instead of peacefully resolving their disputes in court, injury victims
would try to satisfy their grievances through private threats, vio-
lence, and vigilante justice. 7t Such a scenario vividly illustrates the
value of a functioning tort system. But this is not the only-and
perhaps not the most plausible-scenario. It is also conceivable that
most victims would not resort to private violence either because
they are docile, or because the police effectively contain private vio-
lence, or perhaps because injurers as a class command greater force
than victims. Such private passivity, even if unaccompanied by vio-
lence, would have corrosive social consequences. Many important
norms would relinquish much of their power, because few or no
legal sanctions would follow upon their violation. People would
lose the ability to conduct their lives on the assumption that others
would act and respond in predictable, reasonable ways. Unless
other institutions were to assume tort law's role, social disintegra-
tion would inevitably result.
In sum, dispute resolution is hardly a negligible or unworthy
task for tort law to perform; instead, it is vital to the maintenance of
an orderly and rational society. And if dispute resolution is tort
law's principal function, then we ought to evaluate it by focusing on
how well it performs that function, not by its success in achieving
70 Professor Sugarman's attack on tort law considers the possibility that society
-uses the tort process to establish community standards for reasonable conduct," but he
rejects that conception of tort law on the grounds that tort liability rules are too indeter-
minate to give clear signals regarding what behavior is and is not proper. Sugarman,
supra note 1, at 611-12. However, even if Sugarman is right about the indeterminacy of
tort liability rules, his criticism is not directly pertinent to the conception of tort law
advanced here. This essay does not assert that tort law is the source of norms of proper
conduct or that people learn proper behavior directly from tort liability rules. Rather,
tort law reinforces social norms by providing a highly flexible mechanism for imposing
sanctions upon those who violate such norms and thereby cause injury. The lack of
specific substantive content in tort liability rules, far from preventing the performance of
this function, allows tort law the freedom to incorporate social norms with as much or as
little substantive specificity as those norms in fact exhibit. Cf. Smith, supra note 9, at
296-300 (negligence doctrine's "reasonableness" concept is valuable rhetorical device
because it is formal concept with capacity to assume as much or as little substantive
content as given context permits).
71 Cf. Alschuler, supra note 57, at 1815-16 (describing "the Lockean lesson of
Goetz's gun"-namely, lesson that lack of adjudicative services may lead to vigilante acts
such as that of Bernard Goetz).
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other objectives such as compensating victims or efficiently allocat-
ing economic resources.
B. An Individual Perspective: Remedying the
"Sense of Injustice"
Proponents of alternatives to tort law might suggest that if so-
cial insurance programs were to compensate injury victims then dis-
putes would be avoided and dispute resolution would become
unnecessary. This view, however, rests upon an oversimplified, nar-
row conception of the nature of the injuries which tort victims suf-
fer, and accordingly underestimates dispute resolution's restorative
function.
The narrow view of personal "injury" likely derives from the
typical computation of tort damages, which generally enumerates
the kinds of injuries for which the victim may recover damages in
tort cases. The resulting list usually includes lost income, medical
expenses, pain and suffering, and emotional distress or psychic in-
jury.72 To be sure, a tort victim often suffers all of these kinds of
injury, which this essay will refer to collectively as "actual loss."
However, the list typically omits an important element of the tort
victim's injury: it fails to recognize the victim's consciousness of hav-
ing been wronged by the violation of a social norm. This aspect of
injury-the sense of having been wronged-might be termed the
"sense of injustice."173
It is not surprising that discussions of tort damages fail to in-
clude the sense of injustice. As mentioned, a victim's sense of hav-
ing been wronged is normally not an injury for which damages are
available; in most tort cases, the plaintiff can recover only for actual
loss, such as economic loss or physical pain. 74 In addition, most
courts determine whether the plaintiff has suffered from the viola-
tion of a social norm during the liability phase of a tort dispute; they
consider appropriate remedies only after the liability question has
been answered in the plaintiff's favor. Thus, the defendant's viola-
tion of a norm seems to be a prerequisite to a remedy rather than an
element of the plaintiff's injury.
72 See, e.g., D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.1 (1973).
73 Cf. E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE 13 (1949) (the "sense of injustice" is "a
familiar and observable phenonemon" that is "alive with movement and warmth in the
human organism"). The sense of injustice has recently become a subject of study by
social psychologists. See, e.g., M. DEUTSCH, supra note 60, at 180-95; THEJUSTICE MOTIVE
IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 47.
74 The common law has traditionally awarded presumed damages for certain torts,
such as defamation, without proof of actual loss. But these limited instances are excep-
tional; presumed damages for defamation are "an oddity of tort law." Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
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However, drawing sharp lines between liability questions and
remedy questions can obscure the real character of the victim's
grievance. Certainly a defendant's liability should hinge on whether
he has breached a norm. But it does not follow, once a breach is
found, that the breach itself does not contribute greatly to the vic-
tim's injury. As a factual matter, the sense of having been wronged
is an unquestionably real and important aspect of a plaintiff's injury.
Were this not so, one would expect that victims fully compensated
for their "actual loss" should feel satisfied, even with no finding of
wrongdoing and no sanction imposed against their injurers. Law-
yers know, however, that clients are not interested solely in the
monetary amount of their recovery; they frequently want to proceed
with cases just for the "principle" at stake.75 Experimental research
confirms this observation: in simulated studies, social psychologists
have found that injury victims feel most satisfied when the harmdoer
provides compensation. 76 If instead a third party pays compensa-
tion, victims are not as satisfied and may even feel that the payment
constitutes a further inequity.77 One researcher concludes, "It
seems as though receiving the compensationfrom the harmdoer is nec-
essary to produce positive reactions." 78
We cannot dismiss this psychological need for "justice" as
merely an irrational reaction to injury. To one hurt by violation of a
norm, consciousness of the violation is an essential component of
the injury. 79 The tort threatens the victim's ability to rely upon the
75 See VidmarJustice Motives and Other Psychological Factors in the Development and Reso-
lution of Disputes, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 47, at 395, 403
(noting that "it is not unusual for persons to pursue a dispute even after it becomes
abundantly clear that they will incur substantially more costs than can be gained even if
the suit is won").
76 deCarufel, Victims' Satisfaction with Compensation: Effects of Initial Disadvantage and
Third Party Intervention, 11 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 445, 452 (1981). deCarufel's
findings confirm earlier results reported in Miller & McCann, Children's Reactions to the
Perpetrators and Victims of Injustices, 50 CHILD DEV. 861 (1979). Miller and McCann found
that children believe that it is even more important to punish a perpetrator of injustice
than to compensate a victim. Moreover, older children held this belief as strongly as did
younger children. Id. at 866-67.
77 deCarufel, supra note 76, at 452-55.
78 Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
79 Cf. Hutchinson, supra note 21, at 763 ("The victim's agony is not merely the
physical pain, but the frightening realization that she has been destroyed as a person.
Accident victims' self-esteem and confidence in the community 'become as ashes in
[their] mouth[s].'" (quoting R. LEWISTON, Hrr FROM BoTH SIDES 32 (1967))).
[W]hen one person intentionally harms another person (i.e., violates a
rule) far more is involved than the physical, material, or social hurt itself,
[sic] The offender is frequently perceived as demonstrating contempt for
the person harmed, as asserting power over him, or as attempting to as-
sert the superiority of the offender's belief or value system. For the vic-
tim-reactor, therefore, punishment helps to reestablish the psychological
equilibrium by redressing the sense of inferiority that the act of harm has
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norm in question and, inferentially, to depend upon other norms
that the victim had previously trusted. If someone other than the
tortfeasor compensates for actual loss and if society imposes no
sanction upon the tortfeasor, the entire normative structure loses
much of its force. The message conveyed is that although society
cares for those who suffer loss, it also permits people to violate its
norms with impunity.80 But norms that can be violated with impu-
nity cease to be norms and no longer reliably guide conduct.8'
Thus, a breach of the normative order inflicts real psychic injury,
which mere payment of compensation cannot remedy.
Recognition of the full character of a tort injury leads to a
deeper understanding of tort law's remedial function. Tort law's
treatment of injury is not confined to payment of monetary dam-
ages. Although responsive to the victim's "actual loss," monetary
damages do not specifically treat the victim's sense of injustice, an
essential part of her injury. Rather, the tort process's response to
injury includes the liability determination and the assessment of
damages against the tortfeasor. A system of social insurance would go
only halfway: although it would address the victim's "actual loss," it
would lack the tort process's comprehensiveness and sensitivity to
the full scope of the victim's injury.
III
THE OBJECTIONS REEXAMINED: CRITICIZING THE CRITICS
The preceding section suggests that compensation, deterrence,
and punishment are not the primary objectives of tort law. None-
theless, a depiction of tort law which simply disregarded these func-
tions would be incomplete. If tort law is viewed as a system for
resolving disputes, these functions do not disappear, but rather be-
come derivative of tort law's primary objective. Compensating vic-
tims, punishing wrongful conduct, and deterring unsafe behavior
are means to, or consequences of, the resolution of disputes. A dis-
pute resolution perspective thus permits a fresh assessment of these
traditional objectives and of the criticisms they generate.
engendered. Indeed, failure to punish may lead to a greater sense of
inferiority.
Miller & Vidmar, supra note 47, at 155.
80 Miller and McCann offer a possible rationale for the belief of children studied
that perpetrators of injustice must be punished: "Allowing the perpetrator to go unpun-
ished may prove disruptive to social commerce either by allowing him to victimize others
or by allowing him to serve as a model for others to transgress in similar ways." Miller &
McCann, supra note 76, at 867.
81 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
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A. The Logic of Tort Compensation
1. Tort Law's Choice of Beneficiaries
Critics of the tort system argue that it is arbitrary to compensate
persons injured by the negligent conduct of others yet fail to com-
pensate victims of nonnegligent accidents, illnesses, or natural inju-
ries and disabilities. 82 The preceding section's discussion of injury
suggests, however, that the distinction is firmly grounded in social
and psychological reality.8 3 A negligently inflicted injury, one that
results from violation of a social norm, is different in character,. and
not merely in cause, from a natural injury.
Consider the cases of Peter and Paul. Both are paralyzed, Peter
from a fall while mountain climbing, Paul through the reckless con-
duct of a drunken driver. To a point, their injuries are similar: both
will suffer medical expenses, loss of income, physical pain, and loss
of the enjoyment of life. Unlike Peter, however, Paul also suffers
from a "sense of injustice"-a consciousness of having been
wronged by another's violation of an important social norm.84 This
sense of injustice is a very real element of Paul's injury. Moreover, if
it is not somehow remedied, then even if Paul's paralysis is cured
and his economic losses and medical bills are paid, his ability to plan
and conduct his life according to reliable social norms will be
undermined.
Thus, Peter's and Paul's injuries, while outwardly almost identi-
cal, are in fact quite different in character. That Paul's injury may
generate a dispute cognizable under tort law and Peter's injury will
produce only a claim against his medical and disability insurance
policies reflects the difference in character. The distinction between
the cases appears capricious only if one ignores tort law's dispute
resolution function and its concomitant reinforcement of social
norms and views the law simply as an injury compensation scheme.
2. Taming the "Make Whole" Principle
The objection that tort law incorrectly or incoherently meas-
ures compensation, especially when awarding damages for intangi-
ble injuries, 85 raises more complex issues. The basic difficulty
again, originates with the notion that tort law's primary function is
to compensate victims, even though some injuries are clearly not
compensable in any meaningful sense. The primacy of compensa-
tion is closely tied to the entrenched principle that tort victims
82 See supra text accompanying notes 12-13.
83 See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
84 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
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should be "made whole"-a manifestly unachievable goal. Tort
law, it may seem, creates its own predicament by promising the
impossible.
An examination of the anatomy of a tort dispute suggests a pos-
sible escape from that predicament through a more realistic concep-
tion of the "make whole" principle. Section II suggested that a tort
victim actually suffers two kinds of injury: "actual loss," such as eco-
nomic loss and pain and suffering, and a "sense of injustice," a con-
sciousness of having been wronged by the violation of an important
social norm. In section II, I argued that we should recognize this
sense of injustice as an integral element of a plaintiff's injury. The
present analysis can now go further and assert that tort law is primar-
ily concerned with the sense of injustice. This is because tort law's
function is to resolve disputes, and a plaintiff's sense of having been
wronged is what generates a dispute. 86 Absent this sense of injus-
tice, a plaintiff's injury would give rise only to an insurance claim,
not to a dispute. Tort law resolves the dispute by determining
whether a violation of an important social norm has actually oc-
curred and, if so, by affording a remedy that assuages the plaintiff's
sense of injustice.
Although tort law's primary concern is with the victim's sense of
injustice, that concern naturally leads to an effort to compensate the
victim for her actual loss. As a matter of pure logic, of course, dis-
pute resolution need not concern itself with actual loss. A mechani-
cal damages schedule,8 7 or even an authoritative chastisement of
wrongdoers, might suffice to resolve disputes and satisfy injury vic-
tims. Alternatively, victims might be satisfied that justice has been
restored only upon reparations of several times the value of the in-
jury.88 Though not axiomatic or self-evident, however, the "make
whole" principle has a certain logic. The principle assures victims
that they can rely upon norms, not because the norms are inviolable
(a victim is painfully aware that they are not), but because in the
name of the "make whole" principle society will both restore them
to their former positions and hold responsible those who violate
norms. Conversely, if a court has the power to correct detrimental
consequences of the norm violation but declines to do so, the
message is that the plaintiff cannot rely upon the norm. At the very
least, the message is that she will be worse off for doing so and that
86 See Vidmar, supra note 75, at 401 ("It is fair to assert that justice motives underlie
every dispute .... ).
87 See 1 T. SEDGWICK, supra note 16, §§ 9-11 (describing preestablished schedules of
damages used in early Anglo-Saxon law).
88 See Exodus 22:1-9 (Mosaic restitution requirements, ranging from one-for-one
restitution in cases of injury from simple trespass to quadruple restitution for conver-
sion of sheep and quintuple restitution for conversion of oxen).
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violators may benefit by breaching it, because society is unwilling to
back up the norm.
The "make whole" principle is logically sound as long as inju-
ries are truly compensable or, more precisely, as long as monetary
awards can actually restore victims to their previous condition.
Thus, with respect to purely economic losses of ascertainable mag-
nitude, the "make whole" principle poses no problem. The princi-
ple functions somewhat differently, however, with respect to those
injuries, such as intangible injuries, that are not truly compensable.
In such instances, a monetary award expresses the strength of soci-
ety's commitment to the norm that the tortfeasor has violated and
acknowledges the fact and magnitude of the plaintiff's injury. The
award also ensures that the tortfeasor will not profit from violating
the norm.8 9 Thus, an award for intangible injuries makes the plain-
tiff "whole" not by restoring the plaintiff to her former condition,
but by reestablishing her belief in the reliability of the normative
order and thereby alleviating the sense of injustice which is the basis
of the dispute.
When we view compensation and the "make whole" principle
as means of fulfilling tort law's dispute resolution function rather
than as independent objectives of the law, damage awards for intan-
gible injuries appear in a new and more acceptable light. The
"make whole" principle no longer requires that damage judgments
measure the "market value" of the plaintiff's injury or restore the
pleasure/pain ratio which the plaintiff previously enjoyed. The im-
possibility of precisely quantifying intangible injuries does not mean
that awards for such injuries are necessarily illegitimate. Instead, the
dispute resolution conception of tort remedies suggests that dam-
age awards express societal recognition of the gravity of the plain-
tiff's injury. A nominal award for a serious intangible injury, such as
the loss of a limb or of a loved one, would communicate either a
refusal to acknowledge the severity of the plaintiff's intangible loss
or a lack of social commitment to the norm in question. Such an
award would hardly assuage the plaintiff's sense of injustice or reas-
sure the plaintiff of the normative order's reliability. 90 Tort law
89 See Ingber, supra note 13, at 781 ("Refusal to grant damages effectively bestows
upon the injurer a form of legal 'entitlement' to cause the injury.").
90 Because this justification of damages for intangible injuries rests upon social and
psychological premises, and not upon some a priori notion of corrective justice, it need
not hold for all societies at all times. In fact, a small-scale study of injury victims con-
ducted some years ago reported that damages for pain and suffering "had no significant
relationship in assuaging any feelings of resentment." O'Connell & Simon, Payment for
Pain & Suffering: Who Wants What, When and Why?, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 46. If this conclu-
sion is correct, the tort law system could eliminate damages for pain and suffering with-
out any impairment of the system's dispute resolution function. However, the study also
found that most injury victims believe that they should recover pain and suffering dam-
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should aspire in such cases to a symbolic proportionality between
injury and remedy: the more substantial the injury, the more sub-
stantial the award. Instructions that tell jurors to make a "reason-
able" award, but decline to suggest objective guidelines for finding
a monetary equivalent for the injury, 91 probably communicate this
aspiration as well as can be expected.
This analysis of the "make whole" principle may also apply to
damages for losses that, although pecuniary in nature, are unascer-
tainable in amount. When a jury predicts the amount of income a
disabled worker will lose over a period of years, or even decades,
and in doing so estimates how long the worker will live and what
promotions, raises, demotions and layoffs he would have received
but for the injury, it is simply not realistic to pretend that the award
actually restores the worker to the economic position that he would
have enjoyed but for the tort. Courts aggravate this pretense of pre-
cision when they seek not only to determine future lost income, but
also to fine-tune such inherently uncertain amounts for inflation and
interest. 92 Rather than pretending to measure the immeasurable,
ages. Id. at 32, 49. That finding weakens the argument that such damages do not ad-
vance the resolution of disputes.
91 See, e.g., G. DouTmvArrE, JuRY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 6-
14, at 220 (1981); see also 2 E. DEvrrr & C. BLAcEmAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN-
STRUCTIONs § 78.05 (2d ed. 1970).
92 In this decade both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have treated
lower courts to learned discussions of the intricacies of adjusting awards for inflation
and interest. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523 (1983); O'Shea v.
Riverway Towing Co., 677 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1982). These opinions consider the di-
verse factors (social and personal) which may cause wages to increase, as well as the
various components of interest rates. In dealing with the problem of reducing an award
to present value, the Pfeifer opinion debates whether it would be preferable to assume
that the plaintiff, an injured barge worker, would "invest [the damage award] in a mix-
ture of safe short-term, medium-term, and long-term bonds, with one scheduled to ma-
ture each year of his expected work-life," or would instead "invest exclusively in safe
short-term notes, reinvesting them at the new market rate whenever they mature." 462
U.S. at 539 n.23. The Court found, after reflection, "no intrinsic reason to prefer one
assumption over the other." Id. That the plaintiff might invest the award in unsafe
bonds, put it into his savings account, use it to buy a car or make a mortgage payment,
or squander it on a trip to Aruba were possibilities that either did not occur to the Court
or that the Court saw no need to consider. In the end, neither Pfeiffer nor O'Shea speci-
fied any single method for treating inflation and interest. The Supreme Court even
issued a warning-one which ironically seems the more necessary after its own opin-
ion-against believing that the problem could be resolved with "delusive exactness." Id.
at 552. However, the Supreme Court did admonish the lower court to make a "deliber-
ate choice" among methods, id. at 553, and the Seventh Circuit, throughJudge Posner,
insisted that the calculation must be "an analytical rather than an intuitive undertaking."
677 F.2d at 1201. The economic and accounting analysis exhibited in both opinions is
impressive evidence of the literalistic devotion which even judges sometimes pay to the
"make whole" principle. In the abstract, the calculations recommended in these deci-
sions seem perfectly plausible. Whether flesh-and-blood plaintiffs such as Margaret
O'Shea, towboat cook, and Howard Pfeiffer, barge worker, will feel that the fairness of
legal decisions is significantly enhanced by such calculations is perhaps more dubious.
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perhaps the law ought to strive self-consciously for a symbolic pro-
portionality here as well. 93
In sum, if we regard the "make whole" principle and the com-
pensation objective not as the primary ends of tort law, but as means
of achieving the resolution of disputes, then criticisms based upon
these supposed ends lose much of their force. From a dispute reso-
lution perspective it is highly appropriate, rather than a cause for
criticism or puzzlement, that tort law concerns itself only with those
injuries that result from norm violations and which consequently
give rise to disputes. And the impossibility of assigning a correct
market or monetary value to many tort injuries does not discredit
the law's efforts to recognize that such injuries are nonetheless real
and are appropriate subjects for redress.
B. Indirect Deterrence
Scholars advocating deterrence as a principle function of tort
law often assume a direct relationship between liability rules and
real world behavior. Potential tortfeasors supposedly gauge their
precautionary expenditures in direct response to their anticipated
liability. Although such a direct relationship surely exists in some
instances-large manufacturers, for instance, do consider potential
liability in designing and marketing their products-critics properly
doubt the general validity of the psychological assumptions underly-
ing this defense of tort law.94 The dispute resolution conception of
tort law nonetheless suggests that tort law may have a fairly signifi-
cant deterrent function, one that goes largely unnoticed in the typi-
cal "law and economics" debate.
Let it be conceded that most individuals, and perhaps even
most businesses and other institutional actors, do not deliberately
decide upon appropriate levels of safety with their potential liability
in mind. What then determines the degree of caution and safety
which these actors observe in their conduct? Although no single
factor fully accounts for accident-avoidance behavior, one obvious
and influential determinant of safety in everyday life is, of course,
the prevailing normative structure. To be sure, members of a soci-
ety or group may sometimes conform to norms because of antici-
pated rewards for compliance or punishments for nonconformity.
More often, however, the norms serve an informational function:
93 Under such an approach, evidence of lost income would be relevant in determin-
ing the severity of a plaintiff's injury and thus would help establish the proportionality
of the damage award. But because the damage award would not pretend actually to be
paying the plaintiff what he would have earned but for the tort, lost income (although
relevant to the assessment of damages) would not be viewed as the definitive measure of
damages.
94 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
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they teach people what is proper, and people conform because they
believe that the norms reflect correct behavior.95 Most people prob-
ably learn to drive properly, for instance, not by studying traffic
codes or judicial opinions in auto accident cases, but rather by ob-
serving how others drive and then adopting the prevailing methods
in their own driving.
This view of human conduct suggests that although the rela-
tionship between liability rules and safety decisions is usually indi-
rect, it is no less real. People often adopt social norms without
consciously reflecting on their own vulnerability to legal liability,
but the norms themselves are regulated and reinforced by tort rules.
The initial decision to conform may arise out of simple imitation or
perhaps a perception that the norm embodies correct behavior. But
because the norm has teeth, it effectively deters widespread noncon-
formance. If the law imposed no sanctions for norm violations, the
norms would ultimately lose their force and cease to influence the
levels of safety adhered to in everyday conduct. Conversely, when
violators compensate their victims, the breached norms are reaf-
firmed. 96 Thus, criticisms that attack the psychological assumptions
of the economic theory of law fail to show that tort law is without
effect in deterring imprudent behavior.97
C. The Positive Face of Punishment
Responding to the suggestion that tort law punishes wrongdo-
ers, critics contend that retribution or vengeance is simply not a le-
gitimate state function. And even if it were, critics argue, tort law
abuses its license by punishing people who are not blameworthy and
by imposing sanctions grossly out of proportion to the tortfeasor's
95 See E. ARONSON, supra note 62, at 27 (arguing that "conformity resulting from the
observation of others for the purpose of gaining information about proper behavior
tends to have more powerful ramifications than conformity in the interest of being ac-
cepted or of avoiding punishment"); cf. R. AKERS, DEVIANT BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL LEARN-
ING APPROACH 8 (2d ed. 1977) ("After the initial period of socialization most people
conform by controlling their own behavior without further directly applied sanctions.").
96 Cf. E. WALSTER, G. WALSTER, & E. BERSCHEID, EQUITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 56
(1978).
The repentant harmdoer [who voluntarily compensates his victim] should
become a stauncher adherent of the equity norm. He should also serve
as a behavioral model for others ....
... The harmdoer who is forced to compensate at least is dissuaded
from justifying his inequitable behavior and is prevented from serving as
a negative model for others.
Id. (footnote omitted).
97 Professor Sugarman suggests that because "moral inhibitions" deter conduct
that is unreasonably dangerous, tort law has little incremental effect on such conduct.
Sugarman, supra note 1, at 563. Sugarman's analysis assumes, however, that "moral
inhibitions" and tort law are wholly independent constraints, and he thus overlooks tort
law's role in reinforcing those social norms whose very roots lie in "moral inhibitions."
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"fault."98 The dispute resolution conception of tort law suggests,
however, that these criticisms are misdirected and may even negate
each other.
Punishment, viewed simply as vengeance, is admittedly not an
appealing task for the tort law system to perform. Although some
argue that legalized vengeance releases feelings of hostility that
might otherwise erupt in violence,99 the argument is far from com-
pelling. Society might better teach people to control their vindictive
urges than legitimate those urges by giving them the force of law. 100
However, it is not so clear that punishment necessarily reduces to
simple vengeance. Indeed, the second objection to tort law's pun-
ishment function here begins to undermine the first. For if tort law
regularly penalizes people whom almost no one would regard as
blameworthy or imposes sanctions that plainly exceed any standard
of appropriate retribution, then we must begin to doubt whether
vengeance motivates the tort system's imposition of punishments.
It seems more plausible that tort law is doing something other than
merely administering revenge.
But if punishment is not merely vengeance, then what is it?
Section II's discussion of dispute resolution, and in particular of the
tort victim's sense of having been wronged by the violation of a
norm, suggests a more positive side to punishment. A victim's sense
of injustice does not amount simply to an irrational need to strike
back at a wrongdoer; rather, it represents the victim's consciousness
that the normative order upon which the victim has relied has been
threatened, and that if the norms constituting that order can be
breached with impunity then they will lose their meaning and force.
Therefore, when a tortfeasor compromises the normative order,
punishment is not merely vindictive, but also serves a positive, re-
storative purpose. Holding the violator responsible for her viola-
tion restores the victim's confidence in the system of norms and
reinforces the norm in question so that it can continue to provide
coherence and stability to the larger community. 10 1
98 See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text.
99 See ABA REPORT, supra note 6, at 3-16 (arguing that "the right of citizens to bring
suit for private wrongs ... provides an important outlet for conflict that otherwise would
break out into violence").
100 Cf. E. ARONSON, supra note 62, at 192-98 (criticizing "catharsis" hypothesis-the
notion that channelled aggression reduces destructive tendencies).
101 In reality, of course, the positive and vindictive aspects of punishment are not so
easily separable. Miller and Vidmar distinguish the "behavior control orientation" from
the "retributive orientation" of punishment, but they acknowledge that "punitive action
often involves elements of both types of motivation." Miller & Vidmar, supra note 47, at
146. Hogan and Emler speculate that the desire for vengeance is a functional evolution-
ary development arising from the need to maintain social norms:
From the perspective of socioanalytic theory, of which "retribution the-
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This conception of tort law's punishment function responds to
the objection that tort sanctions do not correlate well with fault.
When used in connection with tort doctrines or philosophies, the
term "fault" does not equate with moral culpability.10 2 Rather, if
tort law's purpose is to resolve disputes arising from violations of
social norms, then perhaps "fault" can more properly be under-
stood as "norm violation."103 Thus, even if we agree that a mentally
incompetent tortfeasor is not morally blameworthy, we might none-
theless believe that his conduct violates the social norm prescribing
caution in behavior that may cause harm to other people. A tort
system that finds a morally innocent person at fault, and therefore
liable for injuries caused, is not inconsistent; the system is simply
not using the term "fault" in a purely moral sense.
The fallacy in asserting an incongruity between tort sanctions
and fault becomes more clear if one considers the precise problem
facing a court in a tort dispute. When tragic accidents occur, it is
often true that neither the victim nor the tortfeasor has done any-
thing so morally blameworthy that we can declare that either party
deserves to suffer such a loss. 10 4 Unfortunately, one or both of them
must. Thus, the court's concern is not with a priori conceptions of
justice or moral desert, but rather with the pragmatic, post-accident
problem of proffering reasons why one party should bear a loss
ory" is a corollary, the survival of a culture or a social group depends
vitally on its members' maintaining the rules of the culture. This is par-
ticularly true when culture is considered from the perspective of evolution-
ary theory. The disposition to comply with authority, to respond to social
expectations, and to invent metaphysical rationalizations for the rules of
one's culture is seen as biologically preprogrammed. But it also makes
sense, from an evolutionary perspective, that if one perceives that...
malefactors are not appropriately punished, then one should react with
moralistic aggression. From this perspective, then, perceptions of injus-
tice (defined as others' getting more than their fair share, or not getting
their just deserts after misbehaving) are followed by aggressive reactions
that may serve one's selfish best interests but are not prompted by con-
siderations of self-interest. Rather, moralistic aggression is akin to a re-
flex following perceptions of injustice ....
Hogan & Emler, Retributive Justice, in THE JUSTICE MoTIvE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR, supra
note 47, at 125, 136 (citations omitted).
102 Oliver Wendell Holmes stressed the point over a century ago. See 0. HOLMES,
THE COMMON LAW 107-09 (1881).
103 This is not to divorce "fault" or "norm violation" from morality altogether. The
universe of social norms includes, but is not confined to, the realm of morality. Thus,
"norm violations" might well involve moral breaches, but they just as easily might not.
See supra note 97.
104 Some cases, of course, present the opposite situation; we may feel that a defend-
ant's wrongful conduct is so egregious that the defendant deserves a sanction greater




which neither party may truly deserve.10 5 This burden is vastly dif-
ferent, and less demanding, than the task of explaining why the los-
ing party deserves, in some moral sense, to suffer a sanction in an
amount equal to the victim's loss. The fact that one party's violation
of a social norm caused an injury, and was in that sense his fault,
offers a plausible justification for assigning the loss to that party. To
be sure, the loss actually assigned may greatly exceed any sanction
we might deem an appropriate punishment for such behavior were
we evaluating it in the abstract, without reference to a concrete in-
jury and loss. Accordingly, the justification for imposing such a
sanction upon the violator of a norm works only in the context of a
dispute (which must be resolved) concerning an accomplished injury
(which represents a loss that must be borne by someone). 10 6
By the same token, in some instances the tortfeasor may have
been subjectively incapable of complying with the relevant norm.
That incapacity might render the justification based upon norm vio-
lation less appealing and might in some cases convince courts that
the violation of a norm does not justify assigning the loss to the
injurer. 10 7 But subjective incapacity does not wholly nullify the justi-
fication based upon norm violation. After all, even if the injurer was
subjectively unable to comply with the norm, it remains true that he
reaps the benefits of a society which generally observes and relies
upon the norm. Further, the victim's ability to rely upon the norm
will falter if she is left to bear the loss, and the norm will lose some
of its force and value if society tolerates violations-even violations
committed by subjectively incompetent individuals. Thus, the bare
fact of a norm violation provides at least one reason for holding the
violator responsible. On the other hand, there may be no reason
why the victim should bear the loss as against the violator. There-
fore, despite the absence of moral culpability, the violator of a norm
may properly be held responsible for resulting injuries.
D. The Unification of Tort's Diverse Objectives
A body of law that seeks simultaneously to compensate injury
victims, to deter inefficient behavior, and to punish wrongdoers may
105 The fairest outcome in some cases may be for the parties to share the loss. Com-
parative negligence doctrine permits this solution.
106 To the extent that a tort sanction seems excessive in light of the actual behavior
involved, the dispute resolution conception advanced here does not require that the
excess amount come from the tortfeasor himself (as opposed to some other provider of
compensation, if any exists). Thus, this view of tort law may be entirely compatible with
social or liability insurance programs, so long as such programs retain appropriate sanc-
tions for the tortfeasors. See infra text accompanying notes 111-12.
107 See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 51, § 32, at 175-84 (discussing
application of "reasonable person" standard to physically or mentally incapacitated de-
fendants, children, and abnormally unknowledgeable defendants).
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seem badly fragmented, riven by commitments to incompatible
objectives.' 08 Viewing tort law as a dispute resolution system per-
mits at least partial reconciliation of these apparently conflicting
goals. In this view, tort law's objective is to resolve disputes; it com-
pensates victims and punishes wrongdoers only to the extent that
these subsidiary functions further that objective. Similarly, direct
deterrence of unsafe behavior, to the extent that it occurs, is a valua-
ble but nonetheless incidental benefit of resolving disputes. That
tort law fails fully to realize any or all of these derivative benefits
should be neither surprising nor, in itself, a cause for criticism.
Those benefits are not, after all, the objectives of the law.
Some tensions remain. Dispute resolution still involves com-
pensation, and because many tortfeasors are wholly or partially
judgment-proof, compensation is most likely to occur if injurers are
covered by liability insurance. However, the punishment function
suggests that holding the harmdoer responsible is also essential to
effective dispute resolution and that compensation paid by a third
party will leave the victim unsatisfied.' 0 9 Liability insurance in-
creases the likelihood of compensation, but it removes the major
burden from the tortfeasor. Insurance therefore appears to frus-
trate tort law's punishment function."10
This dilemma, however, may be largely illusory. Although vic-
tims will feel less than satisfied either if their compensable losses go
uncompensated or if tortfeasors escape responsibility for violating
social norms, it does not necessarily follow that dispute resolution
requires that tortfeasors directly pay all of the victims' compensation
costs. We hold tortfeasors responsible (instead of merely compen-
sating victims through social insurance programs) in order to rees-
tablish victims' confidence that a reliable normative order still exists
and that the violators will not profit from their violations. But the
benefit a tortfeasor derives from violating a social norm is often
much less than the victim's loss; indeed, in many instances a
tortfeasor-a careless driver, for instance-may not benefit at all
and may himself suffer from the violation. Forcing the tortfeasor in
such a case personally to pay for the victim's entire loss is hardly
necessary to ensure that the tortfeasor does not profit from his
wrong."II A finding of tortious conduct and the imposition of some
108 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
110 See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 13, at 1197; Ingber, supra note 13, at 790; Sugarman,
supra note 1, at 573-81.
111 Where a tortfeasor does directly benefit from his wrong, as in cases of fraud or
conversion, restitution or "disgorgement" can eliminate the imbalance. See D. DOBBS,
supra note 72, § 4.1 at 224.
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sanction against the defendant, 112 coupled with full compensation
by the defendant's insurance carrier, should suffice to restore the
victim's confidence in the normative order.
This possibility suggests that the tension between compensa-
tion and punishment may be more apparent than real and that wide-
spread liability insurance does not impede tort law's dispute
resolution function."l 3 At the same time, this reasoning shows the
fallacy in the argument that because tort judgments are really paid
by insurance companies anyway, it would be just as well to eliminate
the middleman-the tortfeasor-and to adopt a "no fault" insur-
ance scheme, thereby reducing administrative costs."t 4 Although
providing compensation, such a scheme would sacrifice the tort law
system's principle virtues: dispute resolution and reinforcement of
social norms. 1-5
E. The Question of Cost
Whatever the value of tort law in resolving disputes, the matter
of cost remains. There are, after all, less expensive methods of deal-
ing with injuries, grievances, and disputes; 116 tort law might simply
be a luxury we can no longer afford. Indeed, tort law faces an irony
in this respect. The high cost of litigating tort disputes flows in
large measure from procedures such as discovery and jury trials-
and the consequential need for high-priced legal counsel-designed
to improve the accuracy and fairness of the dispute resolution pro-
cess.11 7 At the same time, by increasing costs these very procedures
may make the tort system less accessible and consequently a less
satisfactory means of resolving disputes. 118 This essay's defense of
tort law thus seems to provide some support for criticisms based
upon high litigation costs.
112 An increase in the defendant's insurance rates might constitute a sufficient sanc-
tion. Professor Fleming notes the likely increase in a tortfeasor's insurance premiums as
one reason for concluding that tort awards continue to serve an admonitory function.
Fleming, supra note 13, at 1197.
113 See supra note 106.
114 See generally O'Connell, supra note 1, at 22-26.
115 Cf E. WALSTER, G. WALSTER & E. BERSCHEID, supra note 96, at 59 (warning of
deleterious social consequences that would attend compensation of crime victims by so-
ciety rather than by harmdoers).
116 See E. JOHNSON, V. KANTOR & E. SCHWARTZ, OUTSIDE THE COURTS: A SURVEY OF
DIVERSION ALTERNATIVES IN CIVIL CASES 85-92 (1977) (discussing possibility of reducing
costs through alternative dispute resolution methods).
117 See Alschuler, supra note 57, at 1824-25 (criticizing American procedural com-
plexity as directly increasing financial cost of obtaining justice).
118 See J. MARKS, E. JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA:
PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION 17 (1984) ("The costs of attorneys, court fees and lost work
combine to bar access [to the courts] for many citizens, middle-class as well as poor,
unless their legal costs are somehow subsidized.").
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At the same time, the dispute resolution conception of tort law
suggests that at least one common cost-based objection to the sys-
tem is misconceived. Critics sometimes focus on imbalance between
the expenses of administering the system or the premiums paid into
private liability insurance programs, and the amount of money tort
victims actually receive. Jeffrey O'Connell, perhaps the foremost
proponent of a no-fault insurance system, contends that only about
twenty-eight cents of every dollar spent on medical malpractice in-
surance and only about thirty-seven cents of every dollar invested in
products liability insurance actually go to injured claimants.1 19
O'Connell argues that a social insurance scheme would be far less
expensive and could therefore pay out in compensation a higher
percentage of the premiums it received.' 20
The flaw in O'Connell's argument is that it conceives of tort law
simply as a method of compensating victims: O'Connell measures
the system's benefit solely by the dollars paid out in compensation.
But if tort law's primary objective is to resolve disputes and thereby
to reinforce social norms, then his analysis is misguided. Tort law's
value lies not in its ability to distribute dollars, but rather in its abil-
ity to further civil peace and enhance the social order. This value,
although difficult to estimate in monetary terms, probably far ex-
ceeds the dollar amounts of compensation that tort plaintiffs re-
cover. For instance, O'Connell's figures attribute no benefit at all to
cases that result in verdicts favoring defendants, because no com-
pensation occurs in such cases-the costs incurred in adjudicating
such cases are simply wasted. From a dispute resolution standpoint,
by contrast, "no liability" decisions are as valuable as those produc-
ing monetary awards to plaintiffs.
The point emerges more clearly through an inexact but useful
analogy to another legal institution that upholds social norms-the
criminal justice system. Traditionally, criminal law has paid nothing
to victims of crime. Although recent victim compensation legisla-
tion 21 has begun to reverse matters somewhat, the compensatory
amounts paid under these schemes are undoubtedly minuscule in
proportion to the expense of the criminal justice system. Nonethe-
less, criticizing the criminal justice system on that ground would be
absurd, for it is clear that the system's primary purpose is not to
compensate victims. A similar response applies, albeit less strongly,
to cost-based criticisms of the tort system. Compensation admit-
tedly plays a much larger role in tort law than in criminal law, but if
119 O'Connell, supra note 1, at 21.
120 See generally id.
121 See, e.g., Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580
(1982).
1987]
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
compensating victims is not the tort law system's primary objective,
then it simply misses the point to contend that compensation figures
can somehow measure the system's value.
CONCLUSION
This essay does not pretend to make the case for preserving the
tort law system. Its aim has been more modest. The essay simply
claims that tort law should be understood-and hence evaluated-
as a system for resolving disputes generated by the violation of so-
cial norms. Whether the system adequately performs its dispute
resolution function remains an open question 122-it is a question
that can be answered not in the abstract, but only through experi-
ence and continuing practical evaluation.
Nonetheless, more general recognition of the primacy of tort
law's dispute resolution function would constitute a valuable
achievement. Most importantly, it would illuminate the fallacy in
critical evaluations that judge tort law by its success, or lack of suc-
cess, in achieving subsidiary goals such as victim compensation, de-
terrence of inefficient behavior, and punishment. In addition, such
a recognition would promote a greater sensitivity to the social and
psychological needs that tort law's dispute resolution function ful-
fills and that proposed alternatives neglect. The dispute resolution
conception thus suggests the need for a more searching evaluation
of tort law than recent criticism typically provides.
122 This essay has considered criticisms calling for the replacement of tort law with
insurance or regulatory schemes, not proposals to replace or supplement tort law with
alternative dispute resolution methods. The latter proposals raise a different set of
questions. See generally S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(1985).
[Vol. 72:765
